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I. INTRODUCTION
Arizona law-like that of most other jurisdictions-requires that a
plaintiff prove damages for loss of future profits (hereinafter "lost profits
damages") with "reasonable certainty." And as in most other jurisdictions,
Arizona law also requires entry of summary judgment under certain well-
defined circumstances. Yet even though Arizona courts have been deciding
lost profits claims in breach of contract cases since before statehood,' not
one has held in a reported decision that a trial court may enter summary
2judgment against a plaintiff on such a claim. Moreover, Arizona trial
courts are decidedly reluctant to award summary judgment on such claims.
That reluctance is not surprising, not only because of the dearth of
Associate, Snell & Wilmer, Phoenix, Arizona. B.S. 1990, M.S. 1992, J.D. 1996, University of
Kansas. The author thanks Jonathan Coury and Paul Nalabandian for their research assistance.
I See Providence Gold Mining Co. v. Thompson, 60 P. 874, 875 (Ariz. 1900).
2 Generally, trial courts may enter summary judgment against plaintiff if the damages claimed are
too "uncertain, contingent, conjectural, or speculative." See Schuldes v. National Surety Corp., 557 P.2d
543, 548-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976).
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supporting appellate decisions, but also because the cases do not explicitly
define the reasonable certainty standard in any functionally meaningful
way. And to the extent they define the standard at all, they use trite phrases
that tend to discourage summary judgment.
The Arizona trial courts' de facto policy of uniformly refusing
summary judgment in defendants' favor on lost profits claims is both
unwarranted and unsound. Breach of contract plaintiffs now raise lost
profits claims as a matter of course. As a result, defendants must spend
great sums fighting such claims in discovery and at trial. In addition,
defendants run the risk of losing substantial verdicts based not on
compensation for harm actually done (to which plaintiff certainly is
entitled3), but on sympathy alone.4 The reasonable certainty standard-
"probably the most distinctive contribution of the American courts to the
common law of damages" 5 -was first introduced to prevent that very
6 7phenomenon. The standard's rigor has since diminished, but the lack of
Arizona cases approving summary judgment on such claims indicates that
perhaps the pendulum has swung too far in plaintiffs' favor.
A closer reading of those cases, however, reveals something different.
Even though the Arizona appellate courts have not explicitly approved
summary judgment against plaintiffs on breach of contract lost profits
claims, they have approved negative disposition of such claims in other
procedural contexts: bench trials, motions for directed verdict, and motions
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In doing so, those courts
implicitly have applied certain principles of insufficiency with respect to
proof of such claims. Those principles should apply equally when
plaintiff's proof is examined before trial. If discovery has closed and all
available sources of favorable evidence have been exhausted, and
plaintiff's proof still violates one or more of them, Arizona's rule of civil
procedure 56 may well make summary judgment perfectly appropriate.
Part II of this Article sets forth typical summary judgment and
"reasonable certainty" standards as applied by the Arizona courts. After
identifying some patterns of proof that the Arizona cases have revealed as
3 See, e.g., A.R.A. Mfg. Co. v. Pierce, 341 P.2d 928, 932 (Ariz. 1959) ("The familiar aim of
compensatory contract damages ... is to yield the net amount of the losses caused and the gains prevented
by the breach of contract .... ); see also 5 ARTHUR L CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1002, at 31 (2d.
ed 1963) [hereinafter Corbin].
4 5 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1020, at 125 ("The law requires that this evidence [of lost profits]
shall not be so meager or uncertain as to afford no reasonable basis for inference, leaving the damages to be
determined by sympathy and feelings alone.").
5 C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGEs 124 (1935).
6 E. AULAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §12.14, at 873 (1982) [hereinafter Famsworth].
7 FARNSWORT, supra note 6, § 12.15, at 881.
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sufficient to meet the reasonable certainty standard, Part III presents an
inductive analysis that identifies the principles of insufficiency implicitly
applied by the Arizona appellate courts-sound principles that should
supply useful guidance in analyzing other jurisdictions' law as well. Part
I then argues that those principles are worthy of at least equal
consideration with the vague and generally plaintiff-biased statements that
currently define the reasonable certainty standard under Arizona law.
Through a demonstrative hypothetical, Part IV harmonizes the summary
judgment standard identified in Part IT with the reasonable certainty
principles identified in Part III and shows that summary judgment is
appropriate, and indeed required, in some cases.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment
Arizona's standard for summary judgment is well-established and
typical. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, deposition[s],
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [the]
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."8
Motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 serve the purpose of
removing from the civil justice system claims that do not warrant a full trial
based on the theory that, under the established facts presented by the
parties, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9 A summary
judgment motion should be granted if the facts produced in support of the
claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of
evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the
conclusion advanced by the proponent.
Arizona law clearly imposes an affirmative obligation on trial courts to
grant meritorious summary judgment motions. Although the court must
view matters of record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and
must deny summary judgment if there is any genuine issue as to a material
s ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 56.
See Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Ariz. 1990); Plattner v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 812 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); see also Daniel J. McAuliffe, ARIZONA CIVIL RULES
HANDBOOK 437 (1997) [hereinafter McAuliffe].
10 See e.g., Riley, Hoggatt & Suagee v. English, 864 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Ariz. 1993); Wagner v.
Rao, 885 P.2d 174, 175 (Ariz. CL App. 1994); see also McAuliffe, supra note 9, at 437-38.
11 See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Yarnell (Smith), 909 P.2d 377, 379 (Ariz. 1995); Gatecliff v. Creat
Republic Life Ins. Co., 821 P.2d 725,728 (Ariz. 1991); see also McAuliffe, supra note 9, at 438.
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fact to be resolved,12 summary judgment should not be denied simply on
the speculation that some slight doubt or scintilla of evidence might
develop into a real controversy in the midst of trial.1 3 Indeed, the Arizona
case of Orme School v. Reeves 14 makes clear that trial courts should apply
the same standards to pre-trial motions for summary judgment as to post-
trial motions for judgment as a matter of law.15 Thus, once discovery has
been completed and the nonmovant can do nothing more to prove its case,16
summary judgment should be granted if the movant has shown there is no
material factual issue to be resolved at trial and that the movant is entitled
to prevail,17 even in typically fact-intensive cases such as negligence18
cases. Under no circumstances is plaintiff automatically entitled to juryconsideration of her claim.
B. The "Reasonable Certainty" Standard for Lost Profits Claims
1. GENERAL
Arizona law, like that of many other states,19 requires that lost profits
claims be proven with "reasonable certainty." Although standards of the
same name apply to claims for other types of damages, including contract
damages generally 21 and tort damages, 22 the standard is different and at
least ostensibly more demanding in the lost profits context.23 Its primary
12 See, e.g., Gatecliff, 821 P.2d at 728; Nanini v. Nanini, 802 P.2d 438, 440 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990);
see also McAuliffe, supra note 9, at 439.
13 See Orme Sch., 802 P.2d at 1008; Shaw v. Petersen, 821 P.2d 220, 221-22 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1991); see also McAuliffe, supra note 9, at 439-40.
14 Orme Sch., 802 P.2d at 1000.
s Id. at 1008.
16 See, e.g., ARz. R. CIV. P. 56(f; see also Orme Sch., 802 P.2d at 1008 & n.1O.
17 See, e.g., Nielson v. Savoy, 464 P.2d 608, 610 (Ariz. 1970); Kiley v. Jennings, Strouss &
Salmon, 927 P.2d 796,799 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); see also McAuliffe, supra note 9, at 443.
18 See, e.g., Dolezal v. Carbrey, 778 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); see also McAuliffe,
supra note 9, at 443.
19 See, e.g., Kerer v. Hughes Tool Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 839, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Pappas v.
Zerwoodis, 153 P.2d 170, 174 (Wash. 1944).
20 See Jacobson v. Laurel Canyon Mining Co., 234 P. 823, 826 (Ariz. 1925).
21 See Rancho Pescado v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 P.2d 1235, 1244 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984) (citing "generally accepted rule of contract law that damages are not recoverable unless they are
reasonably certain"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcI § 352 (1981); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 6, § 12.8, at 841.
22 See Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 720 P.2d 513, 519 (Ariz. 1986).
23 See Gilmore v. Cohen, 386 P.2d 81, 82 (Ariz. 1963) ("The requirement of 'reasonable certainty'
in establishing the amount of damages applies with added force where a loss of future profits is alleged.");
Andrew Brown Co. v. Painters Warehouse, Inc., 531 P.2d 527, 530-31 (Auz. 1975) (same).
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difficulty lies in its nebulosity. 4 The term "reasonable certainty" tells us
nothing about what level of proof suffices-we simply know that "[it
means... that the quality of the evidence must be of a higher caliber than
is needed to establish most other factual issues in a lawsuit. '25  The
standard's name provides no more guidance than does, say, "reasonable
26care" in the negligence context. It is best thought of merely as a
convenient term connoting a level of proof sufficient to satisfy the court or
jury that the competing interests of providing plaintiff with every
reasonable opportunity to prove damages and weeding out illegitimate
claims have been served. 27
2. THE FACT/AMOUNT DISTINCTION
While several cases state that the "reasonable certainty" requirement
28applies to both the fact and amount of lost profits, others do not bother to
distinguish between the two.29 Proof of the fact of damage means proof
that but for defendant's act, profits would have been made.30 Proof of the
amount of damage is self-explanatory.
The requirement that both fact and amount be proven with "reasonable
certainty" is somewhat misleading, for it implies an equivalency of analysis
that does not exist. For one thing, the Arizona courts uniformly state that
amount of damage need not be proven to as high a degree as fact of
damage. 31  Accordingly (and unfortunately), the term "reasonable
certainty" means different things depending on whether fact or amount is at
issue. Moreover, the distinction is meaningless for nearly all practical
purposes because a sufficient proof of the fact of lost profits almost always
24 JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PER.LLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 209, at 335 (1970)
[hereinafter Calamari & Perillo] ("Although the courts have been using more or less the same language [-
"certainty" or "reasonable certainty" -] for well over a century, the stringency of its application has tended
to vary in different decades dependent upon the makeup and philosophy of the bench in a particular
jurisdiction at a particular time.").
25 See id. But see Gulf Homes, Inc. v. Bear, 599 P.2d 831, 834 (Ariz Ct. App. 1979) (implying
identity of "reasonable certainty" and "preponderance of the evidence" standards).
26 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1020, at 124 (comparing "reasonable man" standard).
27 See A.R.A. Mfg. Co. v. Pierce, 341 P.2d 928, 932 (Ariz. 1959) ("The familiar aim of
compensatory contract damages... is to yield the net amount of the losses caused and the gains prevented
by the breach of contract .... ).
28 See, e.g., Andrew Brown Co. v. Painters Warehouse, Inc., 531 P.2d 527, 530-31 (Ariz. 1975);
Rancho Pescado v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 P.2d 1235, 1245-46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); see
also Corbin, supra note 3, § 1022, at 135.
29 See, e.g., Lininger v. Dine Out Corp., 639 P.2d 350, 352-53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Morton v.
Rogers, 514 P.2d 752,757 (Aiz. Ct. App. 1973).
30 See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1022, at 142-43; see id § 1023, at 155.
31 See infra Section ILB.3.
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yields proof of amount as well. Consider, for example, Harris Cattle Co. v.
Paradise Motors, Inc.32  There, Harris Cattle's vehicle smashed into
Paradise's automobile dealership and rendered its showroom unusable.33
Although Paradise could argue that loss of its showroom proved the fact of
damages, that proof would, or at least should, fail without further proof that
the dealership had been profitable before the accident. And proving those
former profits would prove the amount as well as the fact of damages.
Conversely, any proof of amount necessarily must either assume the
existence of fact or demonstrate that existence inherently. Thus, excepting
outlier cases such as Walter v. Simmons34 and Weiner v. Ash,35 it seems
sufficient in most instances merely to question whether plaintiff has proved
its lost profits with "reasonable certainty" and to make no further
distinction.
3. THE PROBLEM OF "VAGUE GENERAL STATEMENTS" FAVORING
PLAINTIFF
The cases are littered with aphorisms that ostensibly flesh out the exact
meaning of "reasonable certainty." In actuality, however, these statements
do little more than provide verbiage to support counsel's or a court's
desired conclusion. And, in general, they tend to weigh against summary
judgment in defendant's favor.
One, "once the fact of damages has been established, the amount of the
damage may be established with proof of a lesser degree of certainty than is
required to establish the fact of damage. 36 Because it is not clear how
32 448 P.2d 866 (Aiz. 1968).
33 Id. at 866.
34 In Walter, 818 P.2d 214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991), the court denied recovery for consequential
damages, including "lost time and inconvenience [sic], [and] loss of earning capacity" because "although
[the plaintiff] may have presented evidence of the fact that he suffered damage that could be deemed
consequential, he presented absolutely no evidence from which a jury could reasonably compute the amount
of this damage." Id. at 221.
35 In Weiner, 756 P.2d 329 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), the court denied recovery of lost profits from
real estate speculation for the period in which the plaintiff was incapacitated due to a gunshot wound
because "bringing in a list of profitable deals made during the period in question by other people, even
when vouched for by a hired economist, is [no] proof that those are the transactions into which plaintiffs
would have entered." Id. at 332.
36 See Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. Tesmer Mfg. Co., 459 P.2d 533, 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969); see
also Coury Bros. Ranches, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 446 P2d 458, 464 (Auiz. 1968) ("Some principles are
accepted everywhere. Proof of the fact of damages must be of a higher order than proof of the amount of
damages."); Jacobson v. Laurel Canyon Mining Co., 234 P. 823, 826 (Ariz. 1925) ("It is now generally held
that the uncertainty referred to is the uncertainty as to the fact of damage and not as to its amount, and that
where it is certain that damage has resulted, mere uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude the right of
recovery.").
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much proof is needed to achieve "reasonable certainty" as to fact of
damage, that comparison illuminates nothing. Moreover, the rule's merit is
questionable. Unlike, for example, tort damages for pain and suffering, lost
profits lend themselves to more concrete quantification. 37 Ledgers are kept;
forecasts are made; taxes are paid. It seems reasonable to require
something like the same degree of certainty as to amount of profits in the
litigation context as is required in the workaday world of business.
Two, a proof is sufficient if the evidence "measure[s] the damages for
loss of profits with as much mathematical precision as the nature of the
claim and the available evidence c[an] provide."38  That rule reflects the
courts' willingness to give an injured plaintiff every opportunity to prove
its damages. But it is uncomfortably circular. And taken to its extreme, it
39makes no sense: if proof is impossible, plaintiff need make none.
Three, "[t]he evidence required to prove loss of future profits depends
on the individual circumstances of each case. ' 40 Plaintiffs frequently cite
such text to argue the impropriety of summary judgment regardless of what
actual facts discovery has revealed. But courts always apply law to an
individual set of facts by observing how that law has been applied to
similar facts. And if the facts of similar cases have tended to yield
particular results, the court hearing a lost profits claim is entitled to
consider those other cases.
Finally, several different maxims combine to form a rule that the means
considered sufficient to prove amount broaden in direct proportion to the
extent to which defendant's conduct caused difficulty in proof. For one
example, "doubts as to the extent of the injury should be resolved in favor
of the innocent plaintiff and against the wrongdoer.",4 1 For another, "'it
would be grossly unfair to deny a plaintiff meaningful recovery for lack of
a sufficient 'track record' where the plaintiff has been prevented from
establishing such a record by defendant's actions."' 42 This rule presents
37 Cf. Isenberg v. Lemon, 327 P.2d 1016, 1023, modified on other grounds, 329 P.2d 882 (Ariz.
1958) ("Proof of lost profits requires much more definiteness [than proof of damages from loss of good
will) because it is capable of proof in many cases with at least an approximation of mathematical
precision.").
38 Hercules Drayage Co. v. Chanco Leasing Corp., 540 P.2d 724, 727 (Ariz. 1975); see also
Grummel v. Hollenstein, 367 P.2d 960,963 (Ariz. 1963); Farnsworth, supra note 6, § 12.15, at 882.
39 See Tucson Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Inv. Corp., 245 P.2d 423, 429 (Ariz. 1952)
("While the method just described presents only an approximation ... because it does not prove [the
victim]'s damages to a mathematical certainty, we think under the circumstances of this case it would be
impossible to do so and therefore the means employed was justified." (emphasis added)).
4 E.g., Short v. Riley, 724 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
41 Gilnore v. Cohen, 386 P.2d 81, 82 (Ariz. 1963).
42 Rancho Pescado v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 P.2d 1235, 1245 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
(quoting Chung v. Kaonohi Car. Co., 618 P.2d 283 (Haw. 1980)).
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another manifestation of the courts' willingness to afford plaintiff an
opportunity to recover. But this rule is of no practical value, especially in
the pretrial context, for it does nothing but beg the question. And the rule's
corollary suggested by some, that particularly willful or bad faith conduct
by defendant warrants relaxation of the reasonable certainty standard,43 has
little practical support in the Arizona cases.44
The maxims set forth above might as well be condensed into a single
proscription: A trial court shall not grant summary judgment in the
defendant's favor on a lost profits claim. As evidenced by the fact that not
a single reported Arizona decision affirmatively has upheld summary
judgment on such a claim, at least in the breach of contract context, the
Arizona trial courts apparently read them that way. That phenomenon is
not surprising: beyond statements to the effect that "'conjecture or
speculation' cannot provide the basis for an award of damages... [and] the
evidence must make an 'approximately accurate estimate' possible,"45 the
cases provide defendants with precious little in the way of maxims with
which to combat the phalanx of trite phrases favoring plaintiffs. So on a
superficial reading, it appears that the pendulum has swung decidedly in
plaintiffs' favor with respect to the "reasonable certainty" standard's rigor.
Yet this author agrees with Corbin that such a degree of judicial uniformity
will be found as to justify us in saying that a rule of law exists. Its real
content and meaning must be determined, however, by observing its
applications in actual cases, rather than by readinj the vague general
statements in which it is often worded in... opinions.
Observation of the "reasonable certainty" standard's application in the
Arizona lost profits cases reveals several principles comprising that "rule of
43 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 12.15, at 882 ("Courts are therefore less demanding in
applying the [reasonable certainty] requirement if the breach was 'willful,' ...."); CORBIN, supra note 3, §
1020, at 126 ("It seems probable also that a lesser degree of certainty will be required as against one whose
breach is described as "wilful" or is motivated by malice or avarice than against one whose breach was due
to misfortune and whose efforts to perform were honest and in good faith."); see also Tucson Fed. Savings
& Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Inv. Corp., 245 P.2d 423, 430 (Ariz. 1952) ("To hold otherwise would in practical
effect let the wrongdoer go free and deny [plaintiff] any relief.").
44 Cf. Purvis v. Silva, 381 P.2d 596, 598 (Ariz. 1963) (reversing trial court's award of lost profits
damages to commercial laundry where defendant had cut off water supply); Weiner v. Ash, 756 P.2d 329,
332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming trial court's refusal to award lost profits damages allegedly incurred
while incapacitated by gunshot wound administered by defendant); Morton v. Rogers, 514 P.2d 752, 757-
58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (reversing trial court's award of lost profits damages where defendant had
misappropriated plaintiff's trade secrets).
45 Gilmore v. Cohen, 386 P.2d 81, 82 (Ariz. 1963) (quoting McNutt Oil & Ref. Co. v. D'Ascoli,
281 P.2d 966 (Ariz. 1955) and Martin v. LaFon, 100 P.2d 182 (Ariz. 1940)); see also Earle M. Jorgensen
Co. v. Tesmer Mfg. Co., 459 P.2d 553, 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (stating that a plaintiff must "furnish a
reasonably certain factual basis for computation of probable losses.").
46 CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1022, at 146.
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law" under which plaintiffs are subjected to a more onerous burden of
proof than a superficial reading of those cases would otherwise suggest. At
a minimum, those principles are worthy of elevation to the same plane as
those so frequently invoked by plaintiffs. Moreover, application of those
principles allows identification of some lost profits claims as illegitimate
before trial. In such cases, Rule 56 imposes on the court an affirmative
obligation to grant summary judgment in favor of defendant.
III. ARIZONA LAW PERMITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON LOST PROFITS
CLAIMS IN BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES
A. Sufficient Proofs of Lost Profits
The Arizona cases have suggested several methods by which a plaintiff
may prove lost profits with reasonable certainty. These include a "history
of prior sales of this identical product by a predecessor or even by a
competitor,, 47 the "profit history from a similar business operated by the
plaintiff at a different location,"4 or "the profit history from the business in
question if it was successfully operated by someone else before the plaintiff
took over."49 It follows that if plaintiff has developed such evidence by the
time discovery has closed, then defendant's summary judgment motion
probably should be denied.
B. Patterns of Insufficient Proof
Even if plaintiff has not produced evidence of the sort identified in the
preceding section, it may well be entitled to present its claim to the jury
because, generally speaking, the "evidence required to prove loss of future
profits depends on the individual circumstances of each case."5° But the
Arizona cases demonstrate that plaintiff is not necessarily entitled to
present its claim to the fact finder, because certain patterns of insufficiency
have crystallized-or at least begun to crystallize-through the courts'
analysis of those cases' individual facts. So although "[t]here is no
satisfactory way of defining what is meant by . . . 'reasonable certainty,'" '5'
and although the patterns at their most basic level merely stand for the
proposition that a lost profits claim, like any other, must be supported by
47 Earle M. Jorgensen Co., 459 P.2d at 539; see also Harris Cattle Co. v. Paradise Motors, Inc.,
448 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1968).
48 Rancho Pescado v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 P.2d 1235, 1245 (Aiz. Ct. App.
1984).
49 Id. at 1245.
so E.g., Short v. Riley, 724 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
51 CALAMARi & PERlLO, supra note 24, § 209, at 335.
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the evidence, the patterns help provide a satisfactory way of determining
whether a particular proof suffices. And should a court find plaintiff s case
falling into one or more of those patterns, summary judgment for defendant
may well be appropriate.
1. FAILURE TO MAKE OUT BEST POSSIBLE PROOF
Although the means considered sufficient to prove lost profits broaden
as proof becomes more difficult, 52 the Arizona cases consistently require
that plaintiff still make out the best proof it can.53 The principle is
sometimes cast in the permissive tone that "plaintiff is required to do no
more than to supply the 'best evidence available' or the 'best available
proof."' 54  As discussed previously,55 that principle makes little sense,
because it implies that if plaintiff can make no proof at all, it need make
none. But if it is to be applied, its logical mandatory component should be
as well: where plaintiff has means at its disposal to make out its proof, yet
does not utilize them, plaintiff is not entitled to any laxity in the standard of
proof. Several cases illustrate.
In Gilmore v. Cohen,56 the Cohens contracted to convey thirteen
residential tracts of land to the Gilmores, which the Gilmores intended to
develop and resell. After conveying six tracts, which the Gilmores
developed and resold, the Cohens refused to convey the remainder, and the
Gilmores sued for lost profits.57 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's directed verdict in favor of the Cohens, noting that the
Gilmores had failed to demonstrate that they had proved all they could:
No books of account or other record of the costs of developing
the first six tracts and their selling price were introduced. Even if
formal accounts had not been kept, and there was no showing that
they were not, informal memoranda of previous transactions or
even past income tax returns showing the profits from the
construction and sale of the first six houses, would have given
52 See, e.g. Elar Inv., Inc. v. Southwest Culvert Co., 676 P.2d 659, 663 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
53 See, e.g., Andrew Brown Co. v. Painters Warehouse, Inc., 531 P.2d 527, 531 (Ariz. 1975) ("the
evidence must provide a reasonable basis for estimating [plaintiff's] loss with as much precision as
possible" (emphasis added)); Gilmore v. Cohen, 386 P.2d 81, 83 (Aiz. 1963) ("Mhe plaintiff in every case
should supply some reasonable basis for computing the amount of damage and must do so with such
precision as, from the nature of his claim and the available evidence, is possible." (emphasis added)).
54 1 ROBERT L DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LoST PROFrrS § 5.3C, at 317 (4th ed. 1992)
(emphasis added).
55 See supra Part ILB.3.
56 386 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1963).
57 l at 81-83.
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added weight to [the Gilmores'] claim.58
In Isenberg v. Lemon,59 Lemon sued for breach of warranty as to the
quality of paint he purchased from the Isenbergs. "[M]ost of [Lemon's]
evidence was apparently intended to establish a loss of profit ' 6° as to a
number of houses for which he had agreed to supply the paint, but whose
painters had backed out of their agreements with him due to the paint's
poor quality. A jury awarded Lemon damages of $31,800,62 and the
Isenbergs appealed on the ground, inter alia, of insufficiency of theS 63
evidence. The Arizona Supreme Court treated the case as an action for
lost profits,64 and, in addressing Lemon's attempted proof from sales of
paint for houses yet to be constructed, disparaged his failure to make the
best evidentiary showing possible to prove lost profits:
It is not at all strange however that Lemon did not know
precisely how many houses were to be built and would require
painting in each of the subdivisions covered by contracts between
him and the paint contractors at the time the contract was made.
But this information had been available to him for two years at the
date of the trial by the testimony of the contractors themselves.
Only three of the contractors were called as witnesses. The
contractors could have given that information and they could also
have testified whether Lemon would have continued to get their
business if he had continued to supply them with the same quality
of paint used in painting the sample and model houses.65
In White River Sheep Co. v. Barkley,66 the plaintiffs, cattle farmers, and
White River, a sheep farming concern, possessed adjacent lands which they
58 Id. at 83 (emphasis added).
59 327 P.2d 1016, modified on other grounds, 329 P.2d 882 (Ariz. 1958).
60 Isenberg, 327 P.2d at 1019.
61 See id. at 1021-22.
62 See id. at 1018.
63 See id. at 1022.
64 See lsenberg v. Lemon, 329 P.2d at 882 (Ariz. 1958).
65 lsenberg, 327 P.2d at 1022 (emphasis added).
66 288 P. 1029 (1930). Some might question the propriety of including this 67-year-old case in
analyzing the "reasonable certainty" standard, especially since, at least nationwide, "[rlecent years... have
seen a relaxation of the requirement Contemporary statements insist only on 'reasonable certainty' rather
than on certainty itself." Farnsworth, supra note 6, § 12.15, at 881-82. But there is no hard evidence of any
relaxation by the Arizona courts since the court claimed to invoke the "reasonable certainty" standard in
White River Sheep Co., 288 P. at 1034. Thus, its inclusion is entirely appropriate.
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67
used to pasture their respective herds and flocks. The sheep wandered
onto the plaintiffs' land, damaging it for cattle feeding purposes. The
plaintiffs' proof of lost profits damages rested on the theory that normally
the entire herd pastured on the land in question would have been raised as
"beef' cattle, which would have fetched $40 per head on the market, but
that because of the damage to the pasturage, half or more of the herd did
not gain sufficient weight and could only be sold as "feeder" cattle at $20
per head.68 The jury awarded the plaintiffs damages of $2,000.69 White
River appealed on the ground, inter alia, that "no damages were proven.
By this assertion [the Arizona Supreme Court] underst[oo]d the contention
to be that the evidence of damages was so indefinite, uncertain and
speculative in its nature as to furnish no reliable or reasonable basis to the
jury upon which to make its calculations.
70
The court reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages alone,
holding "that the evidence of loss submitted by the plaintiffs was too
indefinite, uncertain, and speculative for the basis of a judgment of
damages" 71 and noting that although "[m]ost of the testimony as to the
damages or loss to cattle ... was admitted without objection[, it did not]
possess[] the quality of reasonable certainty required by the law."72 The
court derided plaintiffs' failure to do all they could to prove their lost
profits claim:
It appears that some of plaintiffs' cattle were sold as feeders
.. but the number so sold and the price realized are not given.
The loss estimated by the different witnesses is not based upon a
comparison of the prices actually realized... for beef cattle with
[that] realized for feeders of the same age, size and kind. Such
comparison might have been made, for it appears plaintiffs sold
that spring from another part of their range some beef of the same
stock.73
In summary, the Arizona cases stand for the principle that to meet the
"reasonable certainty" standard, plaintiff must at least make out the best
proof it can. There is an argument that such a rule makes no sense because
the objective issue of whether plaintiffs lost profits are "reasonably
67 White River Sheep Co., 288 P. at 1030-31.
68 M
69 Id. at 1030.
70 Id. at 1032.
71 Id at 1033.
72 Id. at 1034.
73 Id. at 1032-33 (emphasis added).
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certain" bears no relation to the subjective issue of whether plaintiff did its
best. But that argument is not unique; plaintiff already is permitted to
recover upon making the best proof possible, even if that proof fails in
some objective sense. It seems only fair to deny plaintiff recovery
otherwise.74
2. UNSOUND UNDERLYING FACTS OR NUMBERS
Estimates of lost profits frequently are derived from other estimates of
facts or numbers. For example, a plaintiff restaurateur may estimate total
lost profits by subtracting estimated costs per customer from revenues per
customer, and multiplying the result by her anticipated number of
customers. For the end result to be "reasonably certain," the Arizona cases
consistently require soundness in each of those underlying component
values.
In White River Sheep Co. v. Barkley,75 for example, the court speci-
fically noted the unsoundness of the values underlying plaintiffs lost
profits estimate:
It appears that some of plaintiffs' cattle were sold as feeders
I but the number so sold and the price realized are not given.
The loss estimated by the different witnesses is not based upon a
comparison of the prices actually realized.., for beef cattle with
that realized for feeders of the same age, size and kind .... It is
very improbable that the loss of each head of the four hundred
cattle, yearlings, two year olds, three year olds, and cows, would
have been the same or that, as the witnesses state, they would have
sold for $20 as feeders and $40 as beef. Whether the feed of which
the cattle was deprived would have, if eaten by them, put $10 or
$20 worth of flesh on each one of them is of course problematical.
It is clear that the estimates of damages are not based upon cattle
of diversity of age, size and sex as the plaintiffs' were, but upon an
ideal or imaginary conception. The damages, if any, sustained by
the cattle would not be any more uniform than the plaintiffs' herd,
74 See CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1022, at 140 ("A greater amount and a higher degree [of evidence]
are required in those cases in which it is usually possible to produce it than in cases where it is usually
impossible or difficult and the defendant had reason to know it."); CALAMARI & PERII.LO, supra note 24, §
209, at 336-37 ("As a rule, established businesses can prove lost profits on transactions of a kind in which
the particular business has traditionally engaged with sufficient certainty. Even here, however, a verdict for
the plaintiff will be set aside if the court is not convinced that the record contains the best available evidence
upon which an informed verdict can be based.").
75 288 P. 1029 (Ariz. 1930); see supra section lI.B.1 for case facts.
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which were anything but uniform in size, age, and sex.
76
In assessing the sufficiency of plaintiff's proof of damages in Isenberg
v. Lemon,77 the court noted that his testimony
as to the number of houses covered by his contracts with paint
contractors was based on estimates which ranged from 1,800 to
3,000 houses. He testified at the trial he estimated the number of
houses covered by his contracts to be 1,800 to 1,900 but admitted
he had previously stated the number was 3,000 and could not say
which was correct.
Furthermore, he was unable to do more than estimate the
average profit per house. He estimated the average profit to be
$15. He stated square footage in the house was immaterial; that he
based his estimate upon the number of gallons of paint used and
when asked how many gallons would be required for the average
house, he testified 10 to 12 gallons, and later in his testimony he
said 10 to 20 gallons. He stated that 1,000 to 1,250 square feet
would constitute an average of all the houses in Phoenix.78
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on
damages alone because
[a]n estimated 1,800 to 3,000 houses at an estimated average profit
of $15 per house based upon an estimated number of gallons of
paint used per house varying from 10 to 12 gallons at one time and
at an average of 10 to 20 gallons at another is entirely inadequate to
prove either loss of profits or damages for loss of good will.
79
Other cases demonstrate the same principle. In Rancho Pescado, Inc.
v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,80 for example, Rancho Pescado planned
to engage in the business of commercial catfish farming in a portion of the
Gila Bend Canal leased from Northwestern. 81 Rancho Pescado engaged in
"a brief experimental program with mixed results" and eventually obtained
an exclusive license to raise fish in a portion of the canal for a period of
76 White River Sheep Co., 288 P. at 1032-33 (emphasis added).
'n 327 P.2d 1016, modified on other grounds, 329 P.2d 882 (1958).
78 Isenberg, 327 P.2d at 1022.
79 Id at 1023.
so 680 P.2d 1235 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
81 Id. at 1238.
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five years. 82 Northwestern terminated the lease before that period had
expired. Rancho Pescado prevailed in its ensuing breach of contract suit
and the jury awarded him $2,500,000. 83  The trial court granted
Northwestern's "motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
reduced the amount of damages to $101,510, plus attorney's fees. 84 The
reduction in damage award represent[ed] the amount of damages awarded
for loss of future profits. 85
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. With respect to the fact of
damage, the court noted several weaknesses in Rancho Pescado's proof.
First, "various experts testified that catfish farming is an extremely risky
business, even for experienced farmers [which Rancho Pescado was not].
According to the United States Department of Agriculture estimates, the
failure rate is approximately ninety-five percent. Of the five percent who
succeed in fish farming, most are already experienced aquacultural
farmers., 8 6 Second, "instead of the pond method used by ninety-five
percent of all fish farmers, Rancho Pescado utilized a raceway system for
raising its fish. 87 Third, Rancho Pescado's
pilot program was inadequate in a number of important respects,
including its accuracy in predicting the systems effect on disease
propagation, control and mortality rate; growth rate of the fish;
conversion ratio of feed to flesh; and stocking density. These
factors were all considered important factors by various experts in
88predicting Rancho Pescado's success or failure.
Fourth, "there was evidence that ... additional development work had to be
completed before Rancho Pescado could successfully raise fish in the
canal. 89
The court also held that Rancho Pescado had not proved the amount of
lost profits damages with reasonable certainty, and specifically invoked the
unreasonableness of the estimates underlying Rancho Pescado's lost profits
claim. 90 Although Rancho Pescado produced evidence that a California fish
distributor was willing to purchase its entire production, the court noted
82 Id. at 1239.
83 Id. at 1238.
94 Id. at 1239.
85 1&




90 Id. at 1247.
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that "the number of fish Rancho Pescado intended to produce and sell was
an inordinately high number of catfish each year. For instance, its
projection of eight million pounds of catfish per year would be
approximately 11.42 percent of the entire crop of catfish harvested
nationwide in 1977.
' 91
In Morton v. Rogers,92 Morton, an affiliate of Rogers's company,
wrongfully obtained and used that company's trade secrets. After a bench
trial, the trial court awarded Rogers damages of $24,000 based solely on
evidence that "there was some prior history of sales ... totaling $33,000"
and Rogers's testimony that "if [the company] were to gross $33,000 per
year from its sales it could anticipate a profit of $24,000 per year. 94 The
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed for a new trial on damages alone
because that "profit margin was predicated merely on the difference
between the cost of materials and the receipts from the sales. Proof of loss
of profits generally requires some degree of definiteness[, but t]he
testimony concerning [the company]'s potential profit picture is too
speculative to support the judgment in this case."
95
In Logan v. Brown,96 Logan sued Brown for negligence arising from a
drunk driving accident.97 The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's refusal to allow Logan to testify on the issue of lost profits. The
court of appeals held that Logan's proposed testimony on "claimed average
income per mile and average expense relating to a new trucking business"
lacked foundation, noting that "[e]ven though damages for lost profits may
in some instances be shown for a new business venture, they must be
proven with reasonable certainty after an appropriate foundation is
established. The latter is lacking in this case.
Finally, in Purvis v. Silva,99 the Silvas operated a laundry on property
leased from Purvis,'0° and brought suit for wrongful eviction when Purvis
91 Id. at 1246. Also, the California distributor had "typically distributed only one thousand pounds
of catfish per week, an amount far below that which Rancho Pescado contemplated producing," generally
had trouble selling catfish, had never sold catfish canned (as it planned to sell a portion of plaintiff's
production), had been adjudicated bankrupt, and was run by a semi-retiree. Id. at 1246.
92 514 P.2d 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973)
93 Id. at 753-55.
94 Id. at 757.
95 Id
9 725 P.2d 1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
97 Id. at 1132-33.
98 Id at 1138. Although outside the breach of contract context, Logan clearly shows that the trial
judge has the power to take a lost profits claim from the jury, for "[tlailure to instruct the jury on a claim
that has been asserted and on which evidence has been presented is tantamount to granting a directed
verdict." McAuliffe, supra note 9, at 397.
99 381 P.2d 596 (Ariz. 1963).
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turned off their water supply for the two remaining months on their lease.'
01
The trial court, apparently sitting without a jury, awarded the Silvas
$1,350 in damages which consisted of lost profits calculated in the
following manner:
The sum awarded was arrived at by recognizing that [the
Silvas], according to their own testimony, had been receiving a
total of $800 per month gross from four sources. With only two
months to run on the lease this would amount to $1600 expected
gross income less $300 rent yet to be paid plus $50 which
represented the value of butane left on the premises by the lessees.
This was all the evidence offered with regard to damages.
102
The Arizona Court of Appeals remanded for reconsideration of the
damages question because that evidence
fail[ed] to indicate any expense except rent. This [wa]s unrealistic.
In the usual course of such a business there would be cost to
lessees of light and power, water, t[a]xes, advertising, repairs and
maintenance, salaries of employees, if any, and other expenses
usually associated with a business establishment. Furthermore, no
consideration was given to other sources of income than the four
testified to. The main question remains unanswered as to whether
the business had been carried on at a profit or loss.103
In summary, the Arizona cases make clear that where the facts or
numbers underlying plaintiffs estimate of lost profits are unsound, the
resulting estimate cannot be "reasonably certain." There is, of course, an
argument that whether the basis of a lost profits estimate's components is
sound presents no less of a jury question than whether the estimate in toto
proves lost profits with reasonable certainty. But that argument misses the
mark, for if one or more components of plaintiffs lost profits estimates is
clearly unsupported or unsound, then the end result also must be unsound
as a matter of mathematical necessity. Consider again the example of the
restaurateur who wishes to calculate her daily profits for purposes of
proving a lost profits claim. Suppose she knows she will make $15 per
customer in revenue, and that serving each customer will cost $10. Suppose
10D Id. at 597.
101 Id.
02 Id. at 598.
103 Id
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further, however, that she has no idea how many daily customers she will
have. If she guesses 100, then she will estimate $500 in daily profits. If
she guesses 200, she will estimate profits of $1,000. No matter how sure
she is of revenues and costs per customer, the end result can be no more
certain than her underlying guess as to the number of customers.
The requirement of soundness in the facts or numbers underlying
plaintiff's lost profits estimate makes a great deal of sense when a jury's
susceptibility to complex yet misleading methods of proof is considered.
Consider a scenario in which plaintiff projects lost profits from widget
sales through the following method:
Profit = (A purchasers ) x ( B widgets ) x ( C $ revenue D $ profit
purchaser widget $ revenue
Further suppose that plaintiff derived the value of D, the profit margin,
through the following equation'04:
D = 0.01 x Rx (-S ) u-v
V7
R, S, U, and V represent constants derived from plaintiff's expert's study of
comparable businesses. T is another such constant, but plaintiff's expert
merely guessed as to its value. Mathematically, of course, the end result-
plaintiffs estimate of Profit---can be no more certain than the component
values: A, B, C, D, R, S, T, U, and V. And because T is nothing more than
a guess, Profit is nothing more than a guess no matter how certain the other
component values. Yet no matter what steps defendant takes to show that
uncertainty in T necessarily results in uncertainty in Profit, the jury is
unlikely to grasp that fact. Indeed, the jury may well believe that given all
those values, a deficiency in just one simply cannot be that important. But
it can, and is. As a matter of law, plaintiff has failed to prove her lost
profits with reasonable certainty. She is not entitled to present the claim to
a jury in the hope it mistakenly will award her damages anyway.
3. SELF-SERVING ASSERTIONS BY PLAINTIFF
In assessing lost profits claims, the Arizona courts frequently examine
the source of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Where attempted
proofs have been held inadequate, the evidence has frequently derived from
a common source-the plaintiff alone. Taken together, these cases stand
104 This equation is fiction created to prove the point; it bears no relation to any actual profit margin
formula.
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for the principle that, standing alone, self-serving assertions by plaintiff as
to lost profits cannot prove those lost profits with "reasonable certainty."
In Gilmore v. Cohen,0 5 for example, the court cited "the inherent
weakness of testimonial evidence in cases such as this" and noted that
"[t]he evidence relating to damages was all in the form of testimony by
plaintiffs"' 6 in holding that plaintiffs had not proved their claimed loss of
profits from real estate transactions with "reasonable certainty."
In Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. Tesmer Mfg. Co.,'07 Jorgensen contracted
to purchase steel rods of certain qualities from Tesmer for use in
manufacturing tillers. 108 The rods proved to lack those qualities and, as a
result, broke on several tillers. Tesmer sued when Jorgensen refused to pay
for the rods; Jorgensen counterclaimed for breach of warranty. The jury
awarded, inter alia, a year's lost profits to Jorgensen in the amount of
$15,000.109 The Arizona Court of Appeals held that Jorgensen had failed to
prove either the fact or amount of lost profits with "reasonable certainty,"
noting that "[a]ll we have [as to the amount of damages] is an estimate
made by [Jorgensen]'s president (who had no prior experience in selling
agricultural equipment) based upon a few conferences with dealers who
were not even willing to give [Jorgensen] a single advance order."
' 10
111 1 113
The Purvis, Logan,"' and Morton cases demonstrate the same
principle. In each, plaintiffs' attempted proof was held inadequate. In each,
plaintiffs served as the sole source of evidence on which the attempted
proof of lost profits rested.
The rule of those cases is sound. Doubtless there are instances in
which only plaintiff can supply some of the information necessary to prove
its lost profits claim. But there is no reason plaintiff cannot obtain an
independent' 1 4 or expert"1 5 opinion as to lost profits or at least a review of
105 386 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1963). See supra Pan BB.l for case facts.
106 Gilmore, 386 P.2d at 83.
107 459 P.2d 533 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
108 li at 534-35.
109 Id
110 id at 539-40.
III Purvis v. Silva, 381 P.2d 596, 598 (Ariz. 1963). See supra Part lI.B.2 for case facts.
112 Logan v. Brown, 725 P.2d 1130, 1137-38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). See supra Part flM.B.2 for case
facts.
113 Morton v. Rogers, 514 P.2d 752, 757 (Ariz. 1973). See supra Part ILB.2 for case facts.
114 See, e.g., Hercules Drayage Co. v. Chanco Leasing Corp., 540 P.2d 724, 726 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1975) (holding sufficient plaintiffs lost profits proof, which included plaintiffs president's "examination of
the records (invoices) of the past performance of this truck during a comparable period of time, from his
own knowledge and experience in the business and industry, and from the testimony of experts in the costs
of operating similar equipment.").
115 See, e.g., Harris Cattle Co. v. Paradise Motors, Inc., 448 P.2d 866, 869 (Ariz. 1968) (affirming
jury verdict awarding lost profits based, in part, on defendant's "expert" accountant's estimate based on
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plaintiff's own estimates," 6 show that someone besides plaintiff actually
relied on estimates in making some type of business decision, elicit
testimony from potential customers from whom profits would have
derived, 17 or obtain some supporting evidence from the defendant. 118
Two cases cast some doubt on the principle that so far as Arizona law
is concerned, self-serving assertions by plaintiff, taken alone, cannot prove
lost profits with reasonable certainty. But both cases are distinguishable. In
the first, Murdock-Bryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson,"9 Murdock-Bryant
sought and obtained quantum meruit damages from Pearson's company
upon rescinding a construction subcontract, including ten percent profit
based solely on the testimony of Murdock and Bryant, the company's
principals.' 2' The Arizona Court of Appeals held that "both Murdock and
Bryant were qualified to testify that the fair and reasonable profit margin
was ten to fifteen percent, and affirm[ed] the award of ten percent lost
profits."' 122 But there is no indication that Pearson ever raised the issue of
whether such testimony alone could suffice to prove lost profits, let alone
under the reasonable certainty standard. Moreover, the trial court
calculated lost profits by multiplying that profit margin by Murdock-
Bryant's costs, on which "the record contain[ed] extensived . .. ,123
documentation.' Accordingly, a substantial portion of the calculation
was supported by evidence other than Murdock-Bryant's bare assertions.
Finally, the lost profits were those anticipated to arise from the transaction
prior sales). Of course, even hiring an expert does not guarantee that plaintiff can prove lost profits with
reasonable certainty. See, e.g., Weiner v. Ash, 756 P.2d 329, 332 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) ("We do not
believe that bringing in a list of profitable deals made during the period in question by other people, even
when vouched for by a hired economist, is any proof that those are transactions into which plaintiffs would
have entered."); see also Rancho Pescado v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 P.2d 1235, 1246 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1984).
116 See Lininger v. Dine Out Corp., 639 P.2d 350, 353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (noting, in affirming
trial court's award of lost profits damages, that "there was extensive testimony by an expert witness, a
certified public accountant, as to [plaintiff's] method of aniving at the estimate of lost profit.").
117 See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Davis, 413 P.2d 590, 593 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966)
(affirming trial court's award of lost profits damages based, in part, on testimony by prospective purchaser
from whom profits would have derived).
118 See Martin v. LaFon, 100 P.2d 182, 184 (Ariz. 1940) (reversing trial court's exclusion of lost
profits evidence, which consisted the "books of defendant himself, showing the receipts and expenses of the
business during the time the latter operated it.").
119 703 P.2d 1206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
120 l at 1208-10.
121 Id. at 1216.
122 Id Thus, the court of appeals may have, without explicitly saying so, treated Murdock and
Bryant as experts, providing another distinction between that case and those in which the lost profit claim is
based on self-interested assertion by lay persons.
123 Id at 1216 n.6
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between the parties to the suit, not between plaintiff and third parties. It
makes more sense to permit plaintiffs bare assertion to suffice in the
former context, where defendant typically will have first-hand knowledge
of facts with which to dispute assertions that prove unwarranted, than in the
latter, where defendant typically will not.
124
In the other case, Nelson v. Cail,125 a contractor-Cail-sued Nelson,
an architect and agent for Northern Arizona University ("NAU"), for, inter
alia, interference with Cail's construction subcontract with NAU. The jury
returned a verdict for Cail in the amount of $40,000, $30,000 of which was
supported solely by Cail's statement, when questioned as to his expected
profit, "$30,000 on this contract."'' 26  Nelson appealed on the issue of
"whether there was sufficient evidence of damages to support the award
and whether the amount of the award b[ore] a reasonable relationship to the
evidence.127 The Arizona Court of Appeals held the evidence sufficient
and affirmed.
Nelson also is distinguishable from cases establishing the general
principle that self-serving assertions by plaintiff cannot prove lost profits
with reasonable certainty. First, it essentially presents the same scenario as
Murdock-Bryant, in which plaintiff sought damages for profits lost on the
contract in question, not for profits from transactions with third parties.
Second, the Nelson court never really reached the issue of whether the
plaintiff had proved lost profits with reasonable certainty. Rather, it
focused its attention on the defendant's failure to attack the plaintiff's
testimony in any way at trial:
Cail testified that his reasonable profit expected from the
plumbing subcontract was $30,000. In our opinion, this was
sufficient as prima facie proof of the loss. Two weeks of evidence
concerning details of the materials supplied and the work perform-
ed by Cail provided a foundation for his opinion concerning his
anticipated profit from the job. While the dollar sum was his
124 Cf. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 1022, at 136 ("The determination of th[e] amount [of profits]
requires valuation of the two performances to be exchanged[, and is] certain and easy in direct proportion to
the simplicity of the transaction by which the profits are to be made.... The difficulty rapidly increases
when the hypothetical "profits" for which plaintiff asks damages are not merely the difference in market
values of the two commodities but are the profits that might have been made in subsequent transactions had
the defendant performed his contract as agreed."); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 24, § 209, at 335
("Courts do not as a rule impose the requirement of certainty except where the damages in issue involve lost
profits on transactions other than the transaction on which the breach occurred.").
125 583 P.2d 1384 (Adz. Ct. App. 1978).
126 Id. at 1387.
127 Id. at 1386.
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conclusion obviously drawn from his experience with this and
other jobs, it did not fail because there was no documentary
evidence supporting it. Nelson made no objection to the founda-
tion for the answer Cail was asked to give. Cail's competency to
give it could therefore be assumed. The evidence was adequate for
consideration by the jury. There was no challenge to its weight as
there was no cross-examination or contradictory proof on the issue
offered by Nelson.'
28
Thus, the reasonable certainty standard never came into play. As the
court explained,
Our evaluation of this evidence does not conflict with the general
principle that damages be proven with "reasonable certainty." The
principle relates to the foundation necessary to support damage
evidence. In turn, this requires that a challenge be made to the
foundation before the monetary amount is stated by the witness.
Were it otherwise, the party presenting the evidence would not
know when he had established a prima facie case and would be
placed in the position of presenting time-consuming foundation
evidence in many cases when no party to the suit challenges the
correctness of the evidence.
29
Thus, to defeat the rule of Nelson, defendant need only challenge plaintiff's
proof of damages at some point during trial.
Moreover, Nelson was wrongly decided. The real issue in the case was
whether plaintiff's testimony proved lost profits with "reasonable
certainty." The court shifted the issue to the evidentiary question of
whether the plaintiff's testimony had sufficient foundation and held, in
essence, that the defendant had not preserved his "objection" for appeal.
But the issue of foundation, which addresses whether plaintiff had
sufficient knowledge to testify as to lost profits,1 30 is different from the
issue of that testimony's sufficiency. Contrary to the court's belief, the
"reasonable certainty" principle does not necessarily relate to the
foundation necessary to support damage evidence. Plaintiff's proof may
lack "reasonable certainty" because its evidence lacks foundation, but it
may also lack "reasonable certainty" even if sufficient foundation exists for
128 ld at 1387.
129 Id. at 1388 (emphasis added).
130 See 1 MORRIS K. UDAIL, ARIZONA LAWOFEVIDENCE § 111, at 221 (3d ed. 1991).
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every bit of evidence plaintiff offers. 13 1  And when the real issue of the
sufficiency of plaintiffs evidence is considered, it is apparent that the
court's concern that plaintiff "would not know when he had established a
prima facie case'132 is misplaced. Plaintiff, after all, is not entitled to a
"wamin" from defendant that its case lacks sufficient evidentiary
support.
4. EQUIVOCAL, CONTRADICTORY, OR DISCLAIMED PROOF
A final principle demonstrated by the Arizona lost profits cases,
although with somewhat less force than those identified previously, is that
plaintiffs proof of lost profits cannot be reasonably certain if that proof is
equivocal or contradictory. In Gilmore v. Cohen,134 the court affirmed the
trial court's directed verdict in favor of defendant, finding that plaintiffs'
"testimony itself was ambiguous and confused. The plaintiffs seemed
uncertain that they had ever shown a profit from the operation or that future
,,135 136profits were likely to accrue. And in Isenberg v. Lemon, the court
emphasized plaintiff's equivocation and contradiction in his estimates of
lost profits from contracts to supply paint in holding plaintiffs proof
insufficient as a matter of law.' The principle that an equivocal or
contradictory proof lacks reasonable certainty is a good one, for it seems
apparent that if plaintiff or its witnesses lack certainty, the proof must as
well.
IV. A HYPOTHETICAL
As described in the preceding section, the Arizona cases establish four
principles that provide guidance in determining the merit of lost profits
131 Cf., Rancho Pescado v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 680 P.2d 1235, 1246 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984) (describing plaintiffs attempted proof with no reference to any foundational concerns).
132 Nelson v. Cail, 583 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
133 Defendant cannot move for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that "there [wa]s no
legally sufficient evidentiaiy basis for a reasonable jury to find for" plaintiff, ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 50(a)(1), after
the jury returns its verdict unless defendant so moved before submission of the case to the jury, ARZ. R.
Civ. P. 50(a)(2), because "the claimed omission in proof might be cured by a reopening of plaintiff's case."
Standard Chartered PLC v. Price Waterhouse, 1996 Ariz. App. LEXIS 243, at *54-55 (1996). But
defendant can move for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was not justified by the evidence, see
ARIz. R. Civ. P. 59(8), or obtain remittitur, see ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 59, without any such notice. See Singleton
v. Valianos, 323 P.2d 697, 698 (Ariz. 1958); see also McAuliffe, supra note 9, at 474.
134 386 P.2d 81 (Ariz. 1963). See supra Part IILB.l for case facts.
135 Gilmore, 386 P.2d at 83.
136 327 P.2d 1016, modified on other grounds, 329 P.2d 882 (Ariz. 1958). See supra Part ll.B.1
for case facts.
137 Isenberg, 327 P.2d at 1022-23.
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claims before trial. One, where plaintiff fails to utilize available means to
make out its proof of lost profits, plaintiff has not proved those lost profits
with "reasonable certainty." Two, an attempted proof of lost profits cannot
be "reasonably certain" where it rests on unsound or unsupported
component values. Three, standing alone, self-serving assertions by
plaintiff as to lost profits cannot prove those lost profits with reasonable
certainty. Four, plaintiff's proof of lost profits cannot be reasonably certain
if that proof is equivocal or contradictory. Those principles have merit
whether applied in Arizona or elsewhere. The following hypothetical
demonstrates the propriety of summary judgment when those standards are
applied.
Tiny Corp. was formed with a single asset-a patent for the
"blunderbat." As envisioned in the patent, the blunderbat was a baseball bat
made of revolutionary materials which, if successfully developed and
commercialized, could revolutionize the game of baseball. But because of
significant safety concerns associated with those materials' use, no one had
ever developed a functional blunderbat for anything but demonstration
models, let alone commercialized it. And Tiny Corp. had never functioned
as a business entity by selling, leasing, or licensing anything to anyone. In
short, Tiny Corp. was a start-up company with a product that existed on
paper only.
Tiny Corp. entered into a contract with Gigantic Co., a sporting goods
research and development company. Under the terms of that contract,
Gigantic Co. would attempt to develop a blunderbat prototype, and Tiny
Corp. would pay Gigantic Co. for its time and materials up to a given
amount. Once the prototype was successfully designed, Tiny Corp.
planned to generate revenues by licensing that design to manufacturers of
sports equipment.
In the meantime, Tiny Corp. developed a business plan to lure
investors. The business plan was created by members of Tiny Corp.'s
administrative staff, none of whom had any experience in the sporting
goods or professional sports industries generally or with material
technology in particular. The business plan included revenue projections
calculated by multiplying the authors' guess as to the number of baseball
teams that would use the blunderbat each year by several other values. The
business plan, however, contained numerous caveats to prevent potential
investors from actually relying on the projections. In particular, the plan
warned that the projections were subject to a high degree of uncertainty and
that there were no guarantees the blunderbat would ever work as Tiny
Corp. hoped it would. The business plan also carefully noted that the
authors' guess as to the number of baseball teams that would use the
blunderbat was "speculative" and "uncertain."
CONTRACT CLAIMS FOR LOST PROFITS
After working on the project for some time, Gigantic Co. realized that
technology still did not exist to develop a commercially feasible, safe
blunderbat. Relations between Tiny Corp. and Gigantic Co. soured shortly
thereafter, and Tiny Corp. sued Gigantic Co. for breach of contract.
Among other things, Tiny Corp. claimed that by failing to successfully
develop the prototype, Gigantic Co. had caused Tiny Corp. to lose over
millions of dollars in profits it would have otherwise made.
By the time discovery was completed, Tiny Corp. had identified no
evidence to prove its lost profits damages other than its business plan. Tiny
Corp. planned to present its claim to the jury through its damages expert,
who had taken the business plan's revenue projections as given and
estimated lost profits by applying what he believed were appropriate profit
margins, yet the expert himself believed those projections were optimistic.
Tiny Corp. had visited with over ten major and minor league baseball teams
as potential customers before and during Gigantic Co.'s work on the
project. Although each had declined to do business with Tiny Corp., the
company had not deposed a single team as to whether, or under what
circumstances, they might be interested in purchasing blunderbats. Finally,
due to the same technological constraints faced by Gigantic Co., not a
single competitor of Tiny Corp's had successfully developed or
commercialized a blunderbat during the two years since the litigation
began.
Tiny Corp. v. Gigantic Co. presents a paradigmatic scenario for entry
of summary judgment in defendant's favor on a lost profits claim, for
plaintiffs proof violated each of the four principles of "reasonable
certainty" arising from the Arizona lost profits cases. Because Tiny Corp.
had met with several potential customers, it had other means of proof at its
disposal. Instead, Tiny Corp. chose to rely exclusively on its business plan.
The validity of the business plan's revenue projections rested entirely on
guesses by unknowledgeable individuals as to the number of baseball teams
that would use the blunderbat each year. The business plan was no more
than a self-serving assertion of potential revenues designed by Tiny Corp.
to garner investment; neither Tiny Corp.'s damages expert nor anyone else
bothered to verify the revenue projections' reasonableness. Finally, the
business plan contained numerous disclaimers by which Tiny Corp. hoped
to forestall any liability to investors who might rely on its projections. The
evidence left no material fact to be resolved at trial, and Gigantic Co. was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tiny Corp. was not entitled to the
chance that the jury would bail it out.
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V. CONCLUSION
On a superficial level, the Arizona cases "define" the reasonable
certainty standard of proof for lost profits claims vaguely, and in plaintiffs'
favor. Yet application of that standard by the courts reveals that when
plaintiff fails to utilize available means to make out its proof of lost profits
damages, rests its proof on unsound or unsupported component values or
on self-serving assertions alone, equivocates or contradicts itself in making
out that proof, or some combination of these, there is considerable doubt
that plaintiff has proved its lost profits with reasonable certainty-whether
in Arizona or elsewhere. When such failure is manifest as of the close of
discovery, courts have an affirmative obligation to grant summary
judgment. They should not hesitate to do so.
